It is a pillar of employment discrimination law that Title ViI's prohibition of "sex" discrimination lacks prior legislative history.. When interpreting the meaning of sex discrimination protection under Title VII, courts have stated that it is impossible to fathom what Congress intended when it included "sex" in the Act. After all, the sex provision was added at the last minute by the Southern archconservative congressman Howard "Judge" Smith in an attempt to frustrate the Civil Rights Act's passage. Courts have often interpreted the sex provision's passage as a "fluke" that has left us bereft of prior legislative history that might guide judicial interpretation. It is not surprising, then, that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition has been rather narrowly construed.
INTRODUCTION
It is a pillar of employment discrimination law that Title VII's' prohibition on sex discrimination lacks meaningful legislative history.
2 Scholars have noted that, when interpreting the meaning of sex discrimination protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, courts have recited that no one can fathom what Congress intended when it included "sex" in the Act. Courts often insist that the sex provision lacks legislative history-that it was added at the last minute in an attempt to stymie the passage of the Civil Rights Act, that its passage was essentially a "fluke," and that, as a result, we are left with a dearth of women, particularly low-wage workers with familial responsibilities, have not fully realized its promise. 8 This Article claims that the narrow, canonical story restricts the very idea of sex antidiscrimination by denying the decades of feminist activism and significant legislative experience with questions of workplace inequality that occurred prior to the Civil Rights Act and helped to inspire the sex discrimination prohibition. In fact, over the past two decades, scholars have shown that the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII was more than a fluke or a joke perpetrated by Southern segregationists. Important studies have been offered on the role of early Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) Feminists, who advocated for legal recognition of sex equality, as well as the influential role of lawyer Pauli Murray. 9 Studies have shown that ERA Feminists, headed by the National Women's Party (NWP), were instrumental in passing Title VII's sex provision'o and have demonstrated how ERA Feminists struggled for public, formal recognition of women's equal rights." However, this Article focuses on the role of another group of activists within the feminist movement: Working-Class Social Feminists, and later Labor Feminists, who played a key role in promoting equality in the workforce. This Article offers a rethinking of the canonical narrative, rooted specifically in the history of Working-Class Social Feminists and Labor Feminists. It rethinks the received narrative and emphasizes its implausibility in light of the pre-Civil Rights Act contributions feminists made to the national discourse on sex discrimination. It suggests that this rethinking of history may be particularly important for judicial interpretations of Title VII's sex discrimination provision, particularly in today's struggles for the employment equality of caregivers (who are still predominantly mothers), and may support a reinvigoration of sex discrimination doctrine. An initial question must be answered: Who were Working-Class Social Feminists and Labor Feminists? Social Feminists, mainly middle-class Progressives, were active in the early decades of the twentieth century in While these important studies have mentioned Social Feminists, they have not made them their dominant subject of analysis as does this Article. Additionally, while some have deemed Social Feminism as insisting on natural differences of the sexes, see Franke, supra note 4, at 17-20, considering Working-Class Social Feminists' and Labor Feminists' rationales supporting protective labor legislation contributes to a more complex understanding of their motivations and ideologies. Their advocacy was based not merely a belief in women's frailty and reproductive difference but importantly were rooted in a critique of the market and an appreciation for caretaking that coincided with their support for universally extending protective labor regulation tailored to women.
advancing a host of reforms, from welfare to labor regulation.12 Some of their efforts, including the development of sex-specific protective labor legislation (which placed caps on hours and floors on wages) have been criticized for being overly maternalistic and for entrenching stereotypes of women's frailty and domesticity by implying that women are a special, vulnerable class in need of protection from the state and stressing women's natural, reproductive roles. 13 Social Feminists, however, also formed important bonds with activists from working-class backgrounds. The confluence of these groups has led to a branch of feminism known as Working-Class Social Feminism.1 4 These working-class, labor-oriented activists, who operated from the 1910s until the 1940s, were affiliated with the predominantly middle-class Social Feminism, but developed their own nuanced understanding of women's labor. Together, the various branches of Social Feminism sought to develop legislative measures to provide better working conditions, especially for women. Working-Class Social Feminists emphasized that such measures were important to correct power imbalances in the workforce, 15 rather than necessary because of women's frailty. After World War 11, these feminists were succeeded by a group of 14. Barzilay, Labor Regulation, supra note 14, at 134 (noting that Working-Class Social Feminists saw labor regulation as essential to put them on more even grounds with male workers who benefited by affiliation with more powerful unions).
activists termed "Labor Feminists." Like the Working-Class Social Feminists before them, Labor Feminists had an ideological commitment to advancing working women's economic status while acknowledging familial responsibilities, but they also increasingly stressed structural features of the market as hurdles to women's equality. 16 The better-known ERA Feminists supported a liberal, individualistic,' 7 legalist route that would remove formal barriers to equality; strived to treat men and women the same under law; and were most concerned with combatting overt barriers to and biases against individual women in the workforce. Working-Class Social Feminists and Labor Feminists, on the other hand, were more inclined to support affirmative measures taken through state regulation of the market to enable equality and combat structural impediments to women's employment, while at the same time acknowledging familial and caretaking responsibilities. This Article aims to further enrich the history of Title VII's sex discrimination provision by rethinking the legacy of Social and Labor Feminists, who have been largely obscured by a received history that focuses on ERA Feminists. When they are discussed, Social and Labor Feminists are often portrayed as retrograde supporters of sex-protective legislation who based their views on sex stereotypes of a bygone era. By contrast, this Article shows how Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists rooted their arguments for women's equality through legislation in critical accounts of the labor market and acknowledgment of the work done at home. They argued that state protection was especially important for low-wage, non-unionized, workingclass women who lacked the auspices of collective bargaining and could not afford to outsource domestic labor. This Article proposes a new understanding of the legislative history of Title VII's sex provision as built on layers of activism, decades of debates and contestation among factions of reformers, and years of failed attempts to combat sex discrimination in employment. 
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18. Methodologically, this Article maintains that we should understand the legislative history of the sex provision as built on "archaeological" layers, stratums that each left residual ideals and rhetoric from which we may glean richer understandings of the legislative history and the realities against which it was created. and looking further back in time to the long struggle among feminists that began in the early twentieth century. It begins with contestations over the nownotorious "protective" labor laws, continues with New Deal labor legislation (which incorporated an early sex anti-classification provision in salary setting), and traces the contestations of the post-World War II decades, through the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 196319 and the accomplishments of the President's Commission on the Status of Women, all of which led to Title VII's sex provision. The Article argues that these debates and developments constitute decades' worth of legislative history behind Title Vii's sex provision. This history shows that a longstanding desire to ameliorate systemic disadvantages facing women in the workforce set the stage for the provision. The Article claims that, by the time Congress voted to include "sex" in Title VII, sex discrimination was already a well-known, well-documented, robust concept-thanks in large part to the efforts of Social and Labor Feminists.
As law is the dynamic and indeterminate product of human interaction, its interpretation must account for the complexity of legacies that infuse it with meaning. Working-Class Social Feminists and Labor Feminists' actions and ideology exerted important but under-studied influence on the birth of Title VII's sex provision, on the context of its emergence, and on its meaning. It is important to note that affording Social and Labor Feminists the greater recognition they deserve in the history leading up to the sex discrimination prohibition does not necessarily entail lowering our estimation of ERA Feminists' achievements. Rather, by considering the ideologies of the two groups, we can better flesh out what more could be done at present. The contestation between the two feminist stands over the meanings of sex discrimination provides a complex narrative of the provision's parentage. The history of both these feminist strands includes a meaningful and rich shared legacy, which can inform today's legal interpretation of Title VII. This shared feminist legacy may offer a far more robust interpretation of the provision than currently afforded and may support modem-day efforts to enhance the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII. This is especially important given the serious shortcomings in judicial interpretation of the provision.
Part I points to the growing critique of Title VII's jurisprudential enfeeblement, especially with regard to women's marketplace labor equality. Part I discusses the canonical narrative of the sex provisions emergence, including its lack of history and the attention to the ERA Feminists' legal equality-focused approach. Part III sets out to enrich the history of the provision by further explaining and developing the aforementioned trajectory of efforts to ensure nondiscrimination to show the implausibility of the canonical narrative. It offers a rich narrative of the sex provision's parentage by considering the debates over the meaning of sex equality and discrimination that ultimately informed the provision. Part IV considers the shared feminist legacy and argues that a bolstered understanding of the structural impediments to equality that preoccupied the sex-discrimination discourse leading up to the provision's enactment should inform today's Title VII's interpretation. Part V suggests possible legal ramifications of this enriched history.
TITLE VI'S JURISPRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS
On the recent occasion of Title VII's fiftieth anniversary, legal commentators evaluated both its accomplishments and its shortcomings. 32. Albiston, supra note 6, at 1095, 1134-51, 1153-54 (claiming that employment discrimination claims are usually more successful when they focus on eradicating discriminatory animus towards identity-based protected groups and not when they challenge the structures of work despite the latter's importance). 42 While these scholars insist that such Title VII litigation should expand the meaning of sex discrimination to include challenges to policies premised on workers without familial responsibilities, 43 however, others have maintained that Title VII provides little solace for working parents, except in the most extreme and overt cases." Understanding Title VII's sex provision's complicated birth and parentage in a broader context can provide a rich history from which to enhance Title VII sex equality jurisprudence in employment, particularly with regard to caretakers' workplace equality.
33.

II. CANONICAL NARRATIVES OF THE SEX PROVISION'S EMERGENCE
A. Narratives ofBirth
It is a commonplace of employment law that the sex provision lacks meaningful prior legislative history.
45 By most accounts, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act was animated solely by a desire to reduce workplace racial discrimination.46 "Sex" was added as a secondary, under-theorized basis of action, making gender discrimination the "orphan" child of civil rights law.
47
The original version of Title VII prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, and country of origin. During the House floor debates, Representative Howard W. "Judge" Smith, an 81-year-old archconservative from Virginia, offered an amendment adding "sex" to the list 
2016]
Parenting Title VIIof prohibitions. 48 In an astute effort to curtail the bill's prospects for passage, the "killer amendment" 49 was added as an "eleventh hour subterfuge., 50 It was intended to accentuate the absurdity of the idea of equal employment for blacks and whites by linking it with equal employment of men and women-a concept considered an oxymoron at the time. The amendment was indeed greeted with amusement when Congressman Smith presented it. Smith alluded to the hilarity of the bill by referring to a letter he received demanding that Congress equalize the number of men and women so that there would not be a shortage of marriage material to go around. 51 Laughter aside, Smith hoped that the amendment would be so controversial that it would "'clutter up' Title VII so it would never pass at all." 5 2 Women's coverage in Title VII did not, according to conventional wisdom, come from strenuous lobbying efforts by women's groups but was rather windfall-like, an unexpected boon of a "deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it."
53 After a mere two-hour legislative debate, sex discrimination was added accidentally and haphazardly to the list of prohibitions. 54 No committee meetings and no congressional investigations alluded to what this provision might encompass.
B. Narratives of Conception: The Equal Rights Amendment Feminists
Scholars have noted that, although the belief that there was a lack of congressional intent regarding the addition of sex discrimination has become true "by virtue of repetition," 55 it ignores the important role of feminists in promoting the provision.56 Scholars have shown how feminists approached Representative Smith and lobbied him effectively to include "sex" in the bill.
57
These accounts, however, focus predominantly on the role of ERA Feminists, headed by the NWP and active since the 1920s in promoting an Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Opposition to the addition of the prohibition on sex discrimination in employment arose immediately from Rep. Celler (D-N.Y.), an avid supporter of the Civil Rights Act who was apprehensive of Smith's political trick. Celler portrayed a bleak scenario should the amendment pass, listing a parade of "horribles" that included the invalidation of rape laws, retraction of protective labor laws, and compulsory military service for women. 63 But a stark response came from Rep. Griffith, a longtime ERA advocate who supported the amendment, stating on record that, lest the amendment pass, "white women would be last at the hiring gate."6 Much of the legislative discussion
Choices, supra note 9, at 769-74 (emphasizing, however, the importance of Pauli Murray to the provision's enactment).
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Franke, supra note 4, at 23. For Smith this would be a win-win: if the Civil Rights Act were to pass, at least white women would enjoy same rights as blacks, and if the amendment would clutter the bill and curtail the passage of it altogether, then it would be a victory for segregationists.
60. Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 9, at 770. Women's Party members marched to the segregationists beat. For them, equal rights for women would only be undermined by an association with black civil rights"); Mayeri, supra note 2, at 718 (arguing that Pauli Murray's intersectional approach challenges the narrative that the sex provision's primary constituencies were white women and lawmakers hostile to civil rights).
62. Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 9, at 770 (noting that "[fqor years, one of the NWP's primary legislative strategies had been to entice Southem congress members to introduce and support amendments to civil rights bills establishing protections for (white) women"). On the suggested Edith Green (D-Or.), fearful for the bill's passage, spoke in opposition to the amendment. Green claimed that race discrimination was far more severe than sex discrimination, that black women faced "double" discrimination, and that adding the amendment would only clutter the bill.
7
She argued the two issues needn't be conflated, but rather should be dealt with separately. Ultimately, the amendment adding the sex provision to Title VII passed, a development that "could be regarded as a victory for ERA supporters." 69 However, in order to fully understand the complex legislative history and political dynamics animating the provision's birth, it is necessary to reexamine its context in two important ways. First, we should focus on Working-Class Social and Labor feminists, a group that was opposed to the ERA and to Paul's NWP. Recent scholarship on this group's activism and ideology complicates the story of the quest for sex equality in the workplace. This focus not only sheds important light on Paul's motivation for approaching Smith, but, more importantly, provides a robust understanding of what sex discrimination meant at the time for these feminists. Second, we must extend the scope of the inquiry further back in time to the early twentieth century in order to uncover the roots of sex discrimination legislation.
III. NARRATIVES OF PARENTAGE: THE ROLE OF WORKING-CLASS SOCIAL AND
LABOR FEMINISTS
A. Protective Labor Legislation: Between Combating and Reinforcing Sex Discrimination
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, women have been systematically working to combat sex discrimination in the workplace. One method employed to achieve this goal was protective labor legislation. Although protective labor legislation has often been cast as damaging to the them as in need of protection, most agree that protective labor legislation nonetheless improved labor conditions for working-class women at the time. Whether one takes the position that protective labor legislation for women was a means of enhancing economic equality or a mechanism for entrenching sex stereotypes, protective labor legislation generated awareness, debate, studies, and new policies regarding discrimination against women in the workforce. It is therefore important to consider protective labor legislation as a component of the history that ultimately led to the Title VII sex provision's enactment. The Article thus reframes the history of sex discrimination by focusing on the persistent quest for employment equality that began with the enactment of protective labor legislation.
During the early twentieth century, women's participation in the labor force grew rapidly, largely as a result of young migrant women joining the workforce. 74 Millions of working-class women entered gainful employment during industrialization. 75 They were met with harsh working conditions, including extremely long hours, meager pay, employment insecurity, and poor sanitation, to name only a few. 
71.
See WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF, supra note 13, at 8, 10 (noting that union formation proved difficult and the need for legislation became apparent); Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation, supra note 14, at 134 (observing that labor regulation put women workers on a more even footing with male wage earners). While the Muller Court and the Social Feminists who supported its decision argued that hour laws for women were necessary because of women's fragility and maternal roles, Working-Class Social Feminists stressed the compensatory rationale for women's labor regulation and viewed protective legislation as a means to correct women's unequal bargaining power in the market.89 Most young, female immigrant workers supported hour laws and minimum wage laws for women at the time. The ranks of supporters included Mary Anderson and Rose Schneiderman, who had worked long hours in garment factories from an early age for meager pay.
See generally KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY
90 Although Working-Class Social Feminists often worked alongside middle-class women in advocating for legal reform, they had a unique, nuanced understanding of women's workplace experiences that derived from their own experiences in the marketplace. They strived to change marketplace labor to suit their needs.
9 1 Rather than seeing protective legislation as an obstacle to gender parity, they viewed it as a bridge to genuine economic equality. At the time, prominent male unions refused to accept women workers.92 To unions like the American Federation of Labor, women's labor was not real work. 93 Women's work was usually characterized as a temporary detour before marriage, a frivolous choice motivated by a love of luxuries or excitement, rather than based on economic necessity or personal fulfillment. Specifically, many claimed that women worked for unnecessary "pin money" and that their employment displaced real workers (i.e., breadwinning male workers). 94 Working-class women, many of whom had experienced the realities of marketplace labor in factories, began to develop a feminist consciousness and resist the dominant vision of women as secondclass members of the workforce. They refused to accept the notion that a woman's place is only in the home. 9 5 They articulated a political vision entitled "Bread and Roses," 96 which emphasized the need for shorter hours, decent wages, and safe working conditions, along with education, culture, and egalitarian relationships between men and women and between husbands and wives. 9 7 Since unionization for women proved difficult, they hoped that regulation would redress the power imbalances between female workers and their employers, which led to the terrible working conditions they experienced. To them, "genuine equality" required that women benefit from sex-specific laws that would bring their labor experience closer in line with some standards men had achieved through unionization.
98
Anderson claimed women-protective laws were "equalizing in their effect."
99 She explained the practical need for regulation by pointing to women's "double shift." 00 She claimed that women wage earners had one job in the factory and another in the home, leaving them little time and energy to carry on the fight to better their economic status. They therefore needed labor laws. 10 Even though Working-Class Social Feminists aimed to eventually regulate hours and wages for all workers-men as well as women-at this stage they were primarily concerned with women workers, who were far more disempowered than their male counterparts. In accordance with the "entry wedge" theory, they hoped that regulating women's working conditions would be the first step toward wider labor regulation, so that, ultimately, labor regulation tailored to women would improve labor conditions for both sexes.102 Anderson claimed that, in the long run laws that regulated women's employment would also benefit men by "serv[ing] to bring the whole industry up to the standard required for the women working in it." 0 3 She insisted that women would stay in the workforce and that their presence would improve conditions for all workers.1 Anderson and her allies believed that, as more women entered the labor market, the need for regulation tailored to women would grow. Once in place, those regulations could be extended to benefit men as well. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon maximum hour law for both male and female workers, and it seemed as though the "entering wedge" of women's labor laws was advancing labor legislation for men and women. By affirming the law the Court fulfilled reformers' As part of their agenda, Working-Class Social Feminists supported the predominantly middle-class Social Feminists' efforts to establish a federal bureau to advance women's work. After World War 1, the Women's Bureau was established within the U.S. Department of Labor, and Anderson was appointed as its director. As director, Anderson investigated women's working conditions and conceptualized marketplace labor as an important component in working women's lives, alongside but not inherently incompatible with family. 106
B. After Suffrage: A Factional Feud over the ERA and Protective Labor Legislation
After suffrage and the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, a "factional feud"' 7 arose within the feminist movement that would split the movement for decades to come. The rivalry between Social Feminists on the one hand and ERA Feminists on the other starkly divided feminists over how to pursue full-fledged equal citizenship. Some feminists concentrated on obtaining an ERA, while others sought protective labor legislation that would relieve the strain of combining homemaking and marketplace labor. The debate split feminists largely by class: elite, professional, welleducated women, who could potentially compete with men for attractive managerial and professional jobs (and meet domestic obligations by employing others), found the declaration of formal equality with men attractive and promising.'os The NWP, which had until then been committed solely to women's suffrage, replaced its old goal with a new one: to bar discrimination and achieve equal rights for women by removing "all disabilities based on sex."' 0 9 NWP feminists continued to advance the ideal of formal parity that had succeeded in the suffrage campaign by arguing for an ERA to the Constitution. They hoped to create formal equality between themselves and their brothers in the belief that eliminating all legal distinctions between men and women was necessary to secure women's equal status in American society.' 0 NWP Feminists, largely professional and privileged women who were often "long-sought goal: it extended protective law to men in all sorts of industrial work." WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF, supra note 13, at 102. 114. Becker, supra note 11, at 211-12.
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115. COBBLE, GORDON & HENRY, supra note 16, at 10. Paul was primarily concerned with common law constraints on married women and sought to eliminate the common law-sanctioned control of husbands over their wives' ability to make contracts in a free market economy. Joan G. Zimmerman, The NWP continued to argue that protective laws injured women and that women "should be treated as individuals under law, not as members of a suspect class." 1 38
For Working-Class Social Feminists, the NWP's vision of legal equality was too narrow and abstract: it promised an "empty slogan" rather than actual equality. ("The NCL thus faced the discouraging prospect that Adkins would precipitate the invalidation of all the protective labor statutes it had worked for decades to enact and defend across the nation."). Anderson claimed the theoretical approach espoused by women of the upper class did not reflect the needs of working womenl41 and was too intangible and vague.142 Working-Class Social Feminists thought that declaring equality was not enough. They feared that formal equality might turn out to be a hollow, abstract legal principle with no real force. Working-Class Social Feminists observed that men and women enjoyed different degrees of economic power in the labor market. Their unequal power derived from myriad reasons, including the prevailing belief that women's work was not real work, women's limited power within unions, and the strain produced by women's simultaneous family-care and labor responsibilities.1 43 They argued for increased government intervention in the labor market to ensure some of the benefits their male counterparts enjoyed thanks to their powerful unions. They demanded "constructive legislation for constructive equality through specific legislation for specific discrimination." 
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Of this Anderson wrote:
No one knew better than we did that there were many legal discriminations against women on the statute books of the various states. We were working to get these discriminations removed and we were making headway. But we were certain the so-called equal rights amendment to the Constitution would not do the job . . . there was no definition of"rights." There was no definition of "equality." If a state law had different standards for men and women, would the amendment mean that the men should have the women's standards, or the women have the men's? No one knew the answer. . . .[The amendment] was unnecessary because most of the real discriminations against women were a matter of custom and prejudice and would not be affected by a constitutional amendment. . . . [The amendment] was dangerous because it might upset or nullify all the legal protections for women workers that had been built up through the years, which really put them on a more nearly equal footing with men workers.
ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 163. 
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C. An Early Federal Sex Anti-Discrimination Provision in the New Deal
When the Great Depression hit, Social Feminists saw it as a "golden moment"' to press for their entry wedge strategy. The growing concern for breadwinning men's unemployment and the Roosevelt administration's eagerness to solve it appeared to provide Social Feminists an opening.152 They were part of the network surrounding the Roosevelt administration and an engine of its reforms.
153 Their efforts to establish minimum wages and maximum hours were partially successful when the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938. The Act established minimum wages and maximum hours for workers employed in interstate commerce. 154 Finally, protective labor regulation-setting hours of work and providing minimum wage-had been federally extended to include both men and women. ss The Act was a culmination of these feminists' efforts for over three decades to provide for a [Vol. 28:55minimum wage and regulate working hours for women as an "entry wedge" that would be extended to men.'s5 However, often neglected from the history of federal legislation combating sex discrimination in the workforce is an early federal sex antidiscrimination provision that was inscribed in the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. This history is important because it demonstrates an early inclusion of "sex" as an anti-classification provision in federal law long before Title V1I. It is also significant because Working-Class Social Feminists supported it, suggesting that the ideology of sex equality was to a substantial degree shared by both this group and ERA feminists. Of course, the methodological question of how to obtain equality remained largely in dispute. 157 During the economic downturn, wives with paying jobs became the target of discrimination on the widely accepted theory that the economic crisis would be solved if married women would only leave the labor force.'
58 Anderson attempted to dispose of the "pin money theory" upon which these views were based. The "pin money theory" argued that women worked for luxuries, not necessities, and that their employment was ancillary to men's. Men, on the other hand, worked to support their families and served as society's breadwinners. Employers often argued that women did not have the same responsibility to provide for their families as men did, and that paying men and women equal wages for the same work would "bring on a revolution" in the way men and women were regarded and treated in the workforce.1 59 Under
Anderson's leadership, the Women's Bureau investigated and found that the majority of women workers were, in fact, working to support their families and themselves.
Anderson believed that the "pin money theory" was the basis for the lower wages women earned in comparison to men.161 When Schneidermann had worked on a National Recovery Administration (NRA) board in 1933, she 157. The dispute over method contained two axes: (1) context-whether to adopt one general ERA (that would eliminate protective legislation) or "specific bills for specific ills" (that would keep protective legislation for women), COTT, supra note 17, at 127; (2) regulation-over how much should law "intervene" in the market with social feminists significantly inclined to use the power of law to 
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161. Renan Barzilay, Decent Work and Decent Families, supra note 14, at 146-47, and at the basis of discrimination against married women workers. Id. and Anderson observed that women were prescribed lower wages than men when NRA boards established codes.' 62 The Women's Bureau's orientation toward sex equality in the workplace lead it to protest this form of sex discrimination, and to object to the sex-based wage differentials in the NRA codes and Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects.1 63 During the New Deal, Anderson promoted the inclusion in the Fair Labor Standards Act of a sex antidiscrimination provision. She successfully advocated mandating equality in wage rates set by administrative committees and providing for the same federal minimum wage for both men and women. Anderson wrote Section 8(c) of the Act, which read: "No classification shall be made . .. on the basis of age or sex."
6 5 The purpose of this provision was to ensure that minimum wages set by commission boards would be based on "the job" without consideration of workers' sex. The act set standards of minimum wages and maximum hours for workers employed in the manufacture of goods used in interstate commerce. I think I had a good deal to do with getting into that law the statement in connection with fixing wage orders that "No classification shall be made under this section on the basis of age or sex." It was an anxious time for me while the hearings on the bill were going on. The secretary of labor was going to appear and the solicitor of the department, Gerard [Gerald] Reilly, was working up her testimony, I talked to him and said, "Well Gerry, I think we had better put in something for her to say about the same minimum for men and women. . . . Unfortunately when [Perkins] came to that part she left out the two lines . . . . When the hearing was over, I nearly died because not a word had been said about the same minimum for men and women. The newspaper women all rushed up to me and asked why she had left that out. I answered "God Knows! Go up and ask her." But before they got a chance to, Senator Robert La Follette asked if she did not think that women should have the same minimum as men. She said "Yes," and I heaved a sigh of relief. As she went out she said to me, "I fixed that all right, didn't I?" sex classification so that minimum wage administrative committees could not set lower, differential pay for women, as they had done under NRA.' 6 8 While this provision is important for marking an early inscription of sex anticlassification in federal employment law, the paucity of case law interpreting the provision indicates that it did not have a significant impact. Nonetheless, the FLSA represented an affirmation of the belief that women's protective legislation would eventually benefit all workers.1 69 In a sense, the "entry wedge" strategy had succeeded by (somewhat) limiting work hours and instituting minimum wage for men and women workers.' 70 In federalizing previous sex-based wage and hour laws, FLSA represented a facially genderneutral culmination of a decades-long struggle against oppressive labor conditions and for "a minimum standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers."' 7 ' However, Working-Class Social Feminists were not content to end their work with the passage of the FLSA. Anderson petitioned against the exclusion of domestic workers, who were predominantly black women, from the NRA and the FLSA, claiming that their plight was exceedingly serious. 172 She also continued to argue for a general norm of equal pay. Anderson realized that while "equal pay for equal work" was a "catchy slogan," its effect is limited to situations in which women took men's places doing the same exact work, and that, in a labor market that remained segregated by sex, equal pay needed to be applied to the much larger group of women who performed work "comparable" to men's. 73 During Feminists insisted that the marketplace must adapt work patterns to women's typical life courses and demanded fundamental shifts in cultural norms and workplace practices and policies.189 In this sense, they echoed the ideas that Working-Class Social Feminists had espoused earlier: the need for labor regulations tailored to women's lives but which could eventually be applied universally. Post-War Labor Feminists championed a reform agenda that called for an end to "sex discrimination," equal pay for comparable work, economic security with shorter hours, and social supports from the state and employers to ease the burdens of childbearing and childrearing. Some scholars have noted that theirs was a feminism that claimed equality on the basis of their "humanity" rather than their "sameness" with men; where the so-called "masculine" standard didn't fit their needs, they rejected it.1 90 The factional feud that had occupied the feminist movement before the Great Depression was reinvigorated by the War's end. During World War II, while "Rosie the Riveter" was performing work in lieu of enlisted male workers, the NWP lobbied for the ERA.
9 ' As the momentum behind the ERA grew after the War, Labor Feminists realized they needed a more "positive" strategy to oppose it. 
191
. From the 1940s on, the Republican Party endorsed the ERA because it would eliminate protectionist legislation disliked by business. Democrats opposed the ERA at the time because of their ties with organized labor, which supported said protective legislation. Becker, supra note 11, at 215. argued that the "quality and quantity" of women's work equalled that of men and therefore merited equal pay, but also pointed out that "equal to" should not be confused with "same as," since jobs and skills need not be identical to be considered equal under the law.' Similar bills were introduced throughout the following years.' 99 Labor Feminists lobbied for an executive order establishing a federal commission on the status of women tasked with ending the discrimination and disadvantages faced by women workers. They believed that women's oppression merited a variety of governmental interventions; that barriers of race and class are serious obstacles to women's advancements; and that some degree of sex-based protective legislation was socially advantageous to women. They advocated for an end to sex-and race-based discrimination while pointing out that ending discrimination was not enough; without additional, positive guarantees, most working women would not be able to take advantage of equal employment opportunities.200 They therefore pressed for a wide range of positive rights to be enforced by state and employers. These rights included government-funded childcare, and changes in workplace policies to make it easier to combine wage earning and caregiving. Many Labor Feminists, African American and otherwise, saw the civil rights movement as 
COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
E. Anti-Discrimination in the 1960s: Equal Pay, The President's Commission on the Status of Women, and the Enactment of the Title VII Sex Provision
The civil rights movement of the 1950s sparked a public debate about equality and discrimination. With Kennedy's election in 1960, Labor Feminists believed a new day was dawning. The following years would indeed witness a surge of legislation affecting women's rights at work, including the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII. From the perspective of Labor Feminists, these were the products of decades of agitation for women's workplace equality.
Esther Peterson supported Kennedy during his campaign and was appointed by him as director of the Women's Bureau in 1961. The needs of wage-earning women and the civil rights movement were very much in her 205 mind.
She aimed to shift the focus of the Bureau from "professional women" and instead "bring back the spirit of the bureau" from the days of Mary Anderson and Frieda Miller by focusing on working-class, low-income women.206 Under her leadership, Labor Feminists contended that women desired a "secure home and a satisfying job," an ideal difficult to attain because of "prevailing institutions and work practices largely shaped by and for men."207 They called on government to offset some of the disadvantages associated with the "double burden" of home and work. Some believed that structural changes in employment practices would help women combine their two roles successfully, while others stressed the restructuring of caring responsibilities. To these ends, Peterson revived the 1940s agenda, pushing for 
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Id. at 160. Peterson explained her position against ERA by arguing that it would take years of litigation for it to do anything "for women at the bottom" while they would lose the little protections they had. Becker, supra note 11, at 219. a presidential commission on the status of women to help women move into "full partnership and genuine equality of opportunity" and suggest "new and expanded services required for women as workers, wives, and mothers." Peterson read letters the Bureau had received from women all around the country, including mothers protesting the lack of opportunity to support their 223 families.
As Peterson argued that wages should be set without bias on the grounds of sex,224 she showed graphs of the differential earnings of men and women, discussed the marital status of women in the workforce, the promotion of employment opportunities and concluded that old ideas about women's work needed to be "tom down." 227 She discussed the growing female participation in the workforce, the importance of equal pay for comparable work, and the prospects of young female college graduates, claiming that the purpose of equal pay was to set a "rate for the job" but that it may also have "far reaching benefits" by opening up new job opportunities for women.
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During hearings on the Act, Congresswoman Katherine St. George (R-N.Y.), a longtime ERA supporter, rose to amend the bill and substitute "work of comparable character" with "equal work"; she stated that the path to equality lay in "equal treatment" and women's claim to equal citizenship based on sameness with men.229 Despite protests by Labor Feminists that this amendment would weaken the bill and against the PCSW's forthcoming recommendation for legislation implementing "equal pay for comparable work," the Equal Pay for Equal Work bill passed as amended.
2 30 The National Committee for Equal Pay saw the bill's passage as a step forward that could "possibly be improved later"; the Committee was satisfied that the principle of equal pay had at least been widely recognized.
23 1 Peterson observed that, for the many women who had suffered from wage discrimination, the recognition of their equality carried additional symbolic meaning.
232
Importantly, by the time President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act in June 1963, both houses of Congress "had heard ample testimony on the 233 problems faced by women" in the workforce.
Congress specifically used the language of "discrimination on account of sex" in its deliberations on the Equal Pay Act 234 and in the Act's text. 2 35 The Act helped bring to the fore the term "discrimination" with regard to sex,236 as its stated aim was to "prohibit discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages." 237 The decadeslong struggle to combat sex discrimination in pay concluded with a signing ceremony in President Kennedy's office on June 10, 1963, with Mary Anderson, Esther Peterson, Francis Perkins, and Caroline Davis in attendance.238 However, there was worry that equal pay for equal work would mean net job loss for women (who now had to be paid the same as men) and that, since most women fell out of its reach (because they performed different work than men), the drive to enter men's jobs took greater urgency, since other routes to higher pay were now foreclosed.
39
229. 108 CONG. REC. 14,768 (1962). She believed that under a comparable standard, quality of work could be compared, which might lead to further discrimination against women doing equal work. Id. at 14,767; see also COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN'S MOVEMENT, supra note 3, at 165 (discussing St.
George's amendment On average, three out of five working women were married, and, among married women, one third were working in the marketplace.
24 3 The PCSW report brought public attention to the necessity for "equal employment opportunities" 244 for women. It documented widespread workplace discrimination against women245 and pointed out that, despite achieving on average more schooling than men, women in the workforce generally worked in jobs below their capabilities. The report called for "elimination of restrictions on women's employment, and assurance of fair compensation and equal job treatment based on merit."
246 The Committee's report used the language of discrimination and prescribed specific "affirmative steps" that should be taken through regulation "to assure nondiscrimination on the basis of sex and to enhance constructive employment opportunities for women." 247 The
Commission did not endorse the Equal Rights Amendment but rather, pursuant to Murray's analysis, concluded that equal rights for women were already constitutionally guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause. 248. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 243, at 236. In 1962, Murray submitted a paper to the Committee on Civil and Political Rights of the PCSW describing her proposal to seek equality through the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the ERA. She considered the question of sex-specific law and read Muller's purpose "to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon women." Becker, supra note I1, at 226. She suggested a nuanced, functional approach to the forty-year conflict between feminists and posited that the Supreme Court could uphold the sex-specific laws only if they were in fact compensatory. Id. at 226-28; MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 61149, at 16-20. Under Murray's analysis, the protective cover of the Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to reach sex discrimination. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 243, at 238.
249. See generally AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 210 (making specific recommendations on how to ensure nondiscrimination).
report aimed to open up opportunities for women in the market and enhance their satisfaction in non-market endeavours. It called for "affirmative steps which should be taken through legislation, executive or administrative action to assure non-discrimination on the basis of sex, and to enhance constructive employment opportunities for women."
250 It recognized that "women desired self-realization in a multitude of ways," 25 1 acknowledging the work done both in the home and in the market. It claimed that the problems women faced were structural, not individual or private, and that government, employers, and unions were obliged to make long-overdue changes to promote gender equality. and served as chairman of the House Rules Committee, to add "sex" to Title VII. Scholars noted that if the addition "were to result in the bill's demise, Smith, and several NWP members, would be satisfied. Yet if the bill were to pass, Smith agreed with the NWP that it had to include women in its scope: otherwise white women would lack an advantage granted to black men." 269 Pursuant to the NWP's advice, Smith introduced an amendment to the pending Civil Rights Act to include "sex" in the categories protected against employment discrimination.270 The eighty-year-old representative's cunning strategy seems to have been to sink the bill altogether by making it ridiculous.271 The amendment was intended to point out the absurdity of the idea of employment equality between blacks and whites by linking it with equal employment between the sexes, an absurdity at the time. When Smith introduced the amendment,272 he assured the House that he was very serious about his proposal but immediately mocked the issue by reading aloud a letter he had received in support of the amendment that complained women were cheated out of husbands because there were too few men to go around.
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According to some accounts, this was exactly the "trump card" Smith had been waiting to play.
2 74 An arch foe of civil rights, Smith counted on his amendment passing and making the bill so controversial that it would be voted down either in the House or the Senate.275
Smith's strategy put proponents of the bill in a tough spot, as many feared the amendment would threaten protective legislation for women that progressives in labor and social reform groups had worked hard to achieve.
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At first, Labor Feminists opposed the amendment on two grounds. First, the PCSW had asserted that race and sex discriminations were rather distinct forms of discrimination and best treated separately. Second, they feared the amendment would jeopardize the bill, which they adamantly supported in accordance with their belief that the fight against racism had priority since blacks were more heavily discriminated against than women.
277 A debate unfolded. Former NWP member Congresswoman Martha Griffiths supported the amendment, claiming that, without it, white women would be last at the "hiring gate." 278 She acknowledged the plight of black women but also noted that, without the amendment they would have a cause of action against employers who hired only white men, while white women would not.
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Congresswoman Edith Green spoke in opposition to the amendment. Green claimed that race discrimination was far more severe than sex discrimination; that black women faced "double" discrimination on account of their sex and race; and that adding the amendment would only clutter the bill.280 She acknowledged the rampant discrimination against women in the workplace, of which women were made "painfully aware," but remained suspicious of the motives of the amendment's supporters, pointing out that the same men now supporting the amendment were in bitter opposition to women's equality just a few months earlier during the Equal Pay Act debates.
2 8 1 After a two-hour discussion, the coalition of women in favor of the amendment, Republicans sympathetic to the ERA, and opponents of civil rights legislation voted to add 
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Keen on avoiding conference, the White House decided to pursue a Senate vote on the bill exactly as passed in the House. Pursuant to Pauli Murray's assessment that unless "sex" were included in the bill, black women would be further discriminated against,284 Labor Feminists lobbied for the sex amendment's retention, not wanting to risk jeopardizing the bill by opening it up for further debate.
28 5 These women lobbied Senators for the amendment, and Murray circulated a memorandum arguing that omitting sex would weaken civil rights by dividing the interests of two oppressed groups-women and 286 minority women, citing at length from the PCSW report.
The Senate endorsed the bill (including the sex provision) 76 to 18, and two weeks later the House adopted the Senate bill by more than a two-thirds majority. President Johnson signed the measure into law on July 2, 1964.287
The paths to the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 remain distinct.288 Yet scholars writing just after the passage of the EPA and Title VII understood these two legislative schemes as interconnected parts of the equality agenda for women: "The Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and counterpart state laws . . . have provided opportunities for developing a new era in male-female relationships in American society" 289 for which "agitation . . . had been going on for many years."290 Scholarship in the 1960s thus viewed the Fair Labor Standards Act (as amended by the Equal Pay Act), the PCSW report, and Title VII as part of the government's clear concern with women's equity. The rich, shared history of the major strands of feminism leading up to Title VII's sex provision should inform our understanding of the meaning and scope of sex discrimination under Title VII. 284. Murray's argument was that, if "sex" were not added to Title VII, Negro women would have shared with white women the common fate of discrimination since it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether a Negro woman is being discriminated against because of race or sex. Without the addition of 'sex,' Title VIl would have protected only half the potential Negro work force. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 243, at 243. She argued that black women particularly needed protection against discrimination because they are more often heads of families than white women. Id. For an in-depth analysis of Murray's contribution to women's rights, see MAYERI, supra note 149, at 20- 
IV. A RICH LEGACY
The shared history of various strands of feminism provides a meaningful, rich, and important legacy for Title VII interpretation. Along with individual antidiscrimination right and the removal of overt barriers promoted under ERA Feminists' equality approach, Labor Feminists focused on regulating the workplace in ways that would be tailored to women's needs and life patterns. Their immediate goal was to level the employment playing field for women, but they hoped their gains could eventually be extended to men as well. These feminist visions are part of the rich history of Title VII's sex provision.
Even sex-based protective labor legislation, now notorious for its stereotypical portrayal of women as weak and domestic, represented for Working-Class Social Feminists the idea that law could compensate for women's unequal bargaining power in the market. Shortly after the passage of Title VII, Murray and Eastwood noted that the underlying goal of Muller's upholding of maximum hour laws for women was "to secure a real equality of right" for women in their unequal struggle for subsistence. 29 1 The "thrust" of that decision, according to them, was to "equalize the bargaining position of women in industry," 292 though other acknowledged grounds for the decision
293
included maternal health and the wellbeing of the race. Throughout the decades that followed Muller, feminists advocated constructive, affirmative measures to compensate women for their unequal power in the workplace. The President's Commission aimed to implement constructive measures to provide for equality in the workplace, including universal childcare and more job opportunities for women. Attempts to effectively equalize the workplace took many forms, from the now-discredited sex-specific restrictions on long hours upheld in Muller, to the minimum wage advocated in Adkins, to the call for maternity leave in PCSW. But it is clear that equalizing power by changing some of the structural features of the workplace designed with "ideal worker" norms in mind and offsetting some of the burdens of family-care was an enduring goal underlying the history of sex antidiscrimination. This history calls for a robust interpretation of the concept of discrimination. Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists hoped that protective labor legislation for women would someday be extended to men rather than eliminated. Such a broad 291. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 243, at 237. 292. Id. 293. In the 1960s, Murray proposed to distinguish between policies genuinely protecting maternal functions, and those that unnecessarily discriminate against women as individuals. She stated that "the assumption that equal rights for women is tantamount to seeking identical treatment with men" is "an oversimplification." Rather, she asserted that women "as individuals" seek equality of opportunity for employment without barriers built upon the "myth of the stereotyped woman," while, as women, they seek freedom of choice regarding whether to develop their maternal and familial functions, to develop different capacities, or to pursue a combination of these choices. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 243, at 239.
[Vol. 28:55understanding of antidiscrimination must recognize the actual inequalities still suffered by women as a subordinated group, and must address them in order to comply with antidiscrimination's broad remedial purposes. But, as we now know, it must not stop there. It must also extend policies originally tailored to the gendered realities of caregiving to both men and women, so as to avoid the reinforcement of women's secondary status as workers and to normalize men's caretaking roles. 294 During congressional debates over the "sex" amendment, both its proponents and opponents briefly addressed the possibility that it might 29 eliminate protective labor legislation for women.29 Shortly thereafter, however, and given the extremely curt consideration given to this issue during the Civil Rights Act legislative deliberations, some imagined an approach that would not eliminate protective labor legislation for women but rather require that such legislation be applied to both sexes. This approach would comply with Title Vll on the one hand, while sustaining hard-fought labor protections for women on the other.296 Labor Feminists noted that the relationship of Title V1I to protective labor legislation was hardly discussed during congressional debates over the "sex" amendment, and so, they argued, such an interpretation could be contemplated. Expanding protective labor legislation (historically tailored to women) universally would, in a way, be a continuation of the "entering wedge" ideology. Yet, while this interpretation was considered, 2 9 7 it was believed to be "unrealistic" and ultimately the move was away from protective legislation towards the prohibition of class discrimination. 298 In the years after the passage of Title VII, sex-based protective laws were rendered illegal.
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294. See Renan Barzilay, supra note 13, at 427 (enacting such standards to both men and women would promote women's opportunities in substantial ways). Today, Title VII is considered a fairly modest law. It did not guarantee full employment or present any significant challenge to the basic structure of the labor market. It protected only against outright discrimination. 300 Yet, the complex history of the sex provision's birth may transform this understanding. For decades, feminists argued against sex discrimination and presented Congress with the ERA legislative proposals and equal pay bills. Shortly before Congress amended Title VII to include "sex," it had heard ample testimony on women's marketplace subordination during the EPA's lengthy legislative process. In addition, the President's Commission on the Status of Women report generated massive publicity of sex discrimination in the national discourse while also proposing concrete measures to remedy women's marketplace inequality. The decades of debates between feminist factions (in and out of Congress) over the meaning of equality show that, by the time Congress enacted Title VII, "sex discrimination" was a well-known, welldocumented, rich concept. The feminist visions that shaped the concept are part of the rich history of the sex provision, and yet their promise remains to be realized in full.
301
Current understandings of sex discrimination, shaped by the anti-302 stereotyping approach, have made us suspicious of legal measures designed to alleviate the burdens of caretaking. But, if part of the aspiration that led to the inclusion of the "sex" provision was a genuine concern with leveling playing fields by changing work norms to enable employment equality for workers who are caregivers, current understandings neglect the more robust and rich concept of antidiscrimination that prevailed at the time of the Civil Rights Act's adoption. This does not mean we should re-implement sexspecific protective labor laws of the earlier era that applied only to women, but rather that some protective labor laws (limitations on hours, for example) could be applied universally, to men and women, to offset the penalizing effects of caretaking (effects that are still born disproportionately by women). Such "protective" labor legislation would be in accordance with Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists' concern with both caregiving and labor and would represent the culmination of the "entry wedge" strategy. Such legislation might even be acceptable in the eyes of some ERA Feminists if applied equally to both women and men. Feminist scholars have long argued for legislative measures that promote parental (not only maternal) responsibilities and make it feasible and practical for both women and men to play active and meaningful 
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[Vol. 28:55 roles in both the labor market and the family. 30 3 A fuller understanding of the history of the sex discrimination prohibition may promote such legislative initiatives. Until then, scholars suggest using Title VII as a way to protect caregivers in the labor market.
V. RE-CONCEIVING TITLE VI'S SEX PROVISION
Since Congress enacted Title VII, the proportion of women in the marketplace has significantly increased. The rise has been most dramatic for mothers of young children, who are almost twice as likely to be employed today as were their counterparts in the 1970s. 30 Unionization rates are at an historical lOW.306 Income from women's employment is important to the economic security of families, particularly among lower-paid workers, and is crucial to changing gender-role dynamics within heterosexual families. Yet, economic equality still lies out of reach for many women. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently addressed the work/family conflict, concluding that women, who still do the lion's share of caretaking, are severely penalized in the workforce. For low-wage women, caretaking often entails dismissal from jobs or precarious work, while professional women still face "glass ceilings" and "maternal walls" due to their familial responsibilities.
3 0 7
Working-Class Social Feminists argued long ago that the workplace must be regulated to obtain actual equality for women, and Labor Feminists advocated for a broad restructuring of the market that would reconfigure the "masculine patterns" of work that did not fit their needs. 308 Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists sought workplace policies that reflected caregivers' life patterns. They aimed to design workplace law not around what we would now call "ideal workers" 309 -workers unencumbered by familial caregiving responsibilities-but specifically with workers who need time for caregiving responsibilities in mind. These reformers hardly achieved what they envisioned, but their presence in legal history needs to be brought to the forefront, considered part of the history of sex antidiscrimination, and adapted to today's world. This Article suggests two ways that their history may prove particularly important to current-day interpretation of Title VII's sex provision, especially with regard to workers with caregiving responsibilities. 310 First, this history is particularly important for the current-day employment equality of mothers. Motherhood-the most prominent form of caregiving-is most likely to trigger gender stereotypes at work today.
3 1 These stereotypes arise because the workplace is currently designed around the "ideal worker," a worker unencumbered by family caretaking responsibilities and completely available at the employer's service.312 The "ideal worker" model equates the amount of time spent at work with value as a worker. 313 Since most caretaking is still done by women, workplace norms designed around such an "ideal worker" model discriminate against women.31 4 Scholars have initiated and documented a growing body of law, FRD, 15 which addresses cases in which employers treat employees with caregiving responsibilities in accordance with stereotypical attitudes about how that employee will behave rather than on the employee's individual interests and capabilities. 3 16 While many FRD cases are primarily concerned with biases against caregivers, the larger project of "family responsibilities discrimination" argues that designing good jobs around men's bodies and traditional gender roles is discrimination that actually raises gender 317 stereotypes in everyday interactions. Scholars have encouraged the litigation of such cases in the hopes of deterring employers from engaging in role-based discrimination and ultimately changing such work patterns.318 Their approach relies, inter alia, on the interpretation of Title VII's sex provision.319 This Article's enriched history of the sex provision, with its emphasis on caregiving alongside marketplace labor, may support and enhance interpretations of FRD, which stresses alongside the illegality of blatant biases against mothers (and caregivers who operate contrary to gender norms) also the unlawfulness of structural impediments to equality. Ultimately, the rich understanding of Title Vll's history presented in this Article should include interpretations of sex discrimination that deter policies that do not allow for familial caregiving (such as long hours or no paid sick leave). Such interpretations would bolster and support current efforts to enhance the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII.
Second, the enriched history may invigorate theories of discrimination that focus on the discriminatory structure of work-particularly disparate impact theory. 320 Scholars have lamented the courts' general enfeeblement of disparate impact claims. 32 1 Some scholars have claimed that modem discrimination is far less overt and easily proven, and that systemic obstacles to equality bear increasing significance for marginalized groups.322 Facially gender-neutral norms like long hours, travel requirements, and limited leaves often have a disparate impact on caregivers (who are still predominantly women and mothers) and significantly affect their employment opportunities in systemic ways. Rethinking the origins of Title Vll's sex provision may invigorate the interpretation of disparate impact liability with regard to women who are caregivers. Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists' focus on structural features of the workplace and their impediments to equality may help support claims that structural workplace norms make it harder for women to achieve genuine equal opportunity, without forcing plaintiffs to prove discriminatory animus towards specific individuals per se. Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists' understanding of the discriminatory consequences of structural features of the labor market, and their notion that law should be "equalizing" in its "effect,"323 may strengthen disparate impact claims and enhance arguments that workplace structures that do not take into account norms and practices that result in sex discrimination are actually discriminatory. Once such claims are invigorated by courts, hopefully, employers will be inclined to reshape their work policies to better enable caretaking (for example, by introducing a general cap on hours or providing generous family leave) so as not to face Title VII liability. These new norms, which would be designed with caretaking in mind, should be applied universally to men and women, effectively bringing the entry wedge strategy full circle.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides an excavationof the historical foundations of a robust and expansive notion of employment equality grounded in the experience of 320. Under the disparate impact theory, employers' practices, procedures and policies that appear to be neutral on their face may be found to violate Title VII if they have a significantly negative impact on workers of one sex, for examples see CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHAELAN, supra note 41, at 106-12.
321. Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists in decades leading up to the enactment of Title VII's sex provision. It offers a rich history of the birth of the sex discrimination prohibition by focusing on Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists' efforts to achieve employment and economic equality, especially for workers with familial caretaking responsibilities. These feminists enlisted the law in order to compensate them for their unequal power in the workplace, which resulted from structural impediments generated by the market, unions, and the family-most notably, women's limited powers within unions and women's positioning within the family as caretakers. They sought state regulation of the market and state responsibility for women's employment equality. The Article claims that their efforts in obtaining protective labor regulation, their role in the enactment of sex anti-classification in the Fair Labor Standards Act, their quest for equal pay in the post-War decades, the enactment of the Equal Pay Act in 1963, and their role in the 1963 President's Commission on the Status of Women informs the history of the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII. Without a robust understanding of the sex discrimination provision's legislative history, we risk receiving even weaker and more convoluted court decisions that deny the provision's substantive importance. Furthermore, the narrative presented in this Article could provide for a fuller account of the meaning of sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act and a basis for an informed interpretation of what constitutes sex discrimination in employment. Such a reconfiguration would seriously take into account structural features of the market, as well as the fact that women continue to provide the lion's share of family caretaking, and would require workplace policies that apply equally to men and women and ensure antidiscrimination by keeping caretaking in mind. This rethinking of the history of Title VII sex discrimination aspires to spark a reinterpretation of the antidiscrimination mandate as including work policies that ensure equal opportunity, especially for working caretakers who are still disproportionately mothers.
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